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GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT LAW -SOME LESSONS
FROM INSURANCE LAW
Reuben A. Hasson*
In the last few years there has been a flurry of writing in
Canada on whether there is a need for a doctrine of "good faith"
in contract law.1
One commentator has stated that the requirement of "good
faith" is already part of Canadian contract law2 although the same
author later says, somewhat inconsistently, that "the doctrinal
development is less than a judicial half-step away". 3 The
generally accepted view, however, is that of the Ontario Law
Reform Commission which in its Report on Sale of Goods stated
that "It cannot be said that good faith is already an integral part
of our sales law" .4
Once we turn to definitions of what good faith is, we find
phrases that are deliciously vague, such as, "fair conduct", 5
"ethical ideas of fair dealing", 6 "decent behaviour ' 7 and "com-
munity standards of fairness, decency and reasonableness". 8
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am indebted to my
colleagues Professors Harry Glasbeck and David Vaver for reading the article and
making valuable suggestions.
l See Trebilcock, Good Faith in Sales Transactions, Research Paper No. II. 3, Ontario
Law Reform Commission, Sale of Goods Project; Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Report on the Sale of Goods (1979), Vol. 1, pp. 163 et seq.; Reiter, "Good Faith in
Contracts", 17 Valparaiso U.L. Rev. 705 (1983); Girard, "'Good Faith' in Contract
Performance: Principle or Placebo?", 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 309 (1983); Bridge, "Does
Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?", 9 C.B.L.J. 385
(1984); Belobaba, "Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law" and Grover, "A Solicitor
Looks at Good Faith in Commercial Transactions". Both the last two contributions
appear in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures, Commercial Law (Toronto,
Richard DeBoo, 1985), pp. 73 and 93 respectively.
2 See Belobaba, supra, footnote 1, at p. 73, where the author writes: "I argue that good
faith and fair dealing are already a de facto doctrine".
3 Ibid., at p. 77.
4 See, supra, footnote 1, at p. 163. See also Bridge, supra, footnote 1.
5 See Holmes, "A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in
Contract Formation", 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 381 (1978), at p. 442.
6 Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Harv. U. Press, 1981), p. 83.
7 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Sale of Goods, supra, footnote 1, at p.
163.
8 See Thigpen, "Good Faith Performance under Percentage Leases", 51 Miss. L.J. 315
(1981), at p. 321.
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The purpose of this article is to show that "good faith" has had
a long history in the law of insurance which the Canadian
advocates of a requirement of "good faith" have ignored and
which, if considered, might have given them pause.
I will try to show in this article, that "good faith" has radically
different meanings in English, Canadian and U.S. law. The
courts in the U.S. have seen "decent behaviour" and "com-
munity standards of fairness and decency" in an entirely different
light from the way that courts in England and Canada have seen
these standards. Moreover, the results generated from "good
faith" as applied in all these jurisdictions range from the unsatis-
factory to the grotesque. The brocard frequently is a proxy for
some pet policy the court thinks should be advanced.
I will then argue that the judges be given detailed guidance as
to what constitutes "decent behaviour" rather than that they try
to give meaning to such amorphous phrases according to their
own individual perceptions. The moral for general contract law
will be obvious.
Good Faith in English Insurance Law9
In England good faith is uberrima fides - utmost good faith.
The starting point is Lord Mansfield's opinion in Carter v.
Boehm.10 The statement by Lord Mansfield that has been cited to
the exclusion of everything else in that opinion is the following: 1
The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed,
lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only; the under-writer
trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not
keep back any circumstances within his knowledge, to mislead the under-
writer into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him
to estimate the risque, as if it did not exist.
That statement has been read as requiring a very wide duty of
disclosure on the part of the insured. Two points need to be made
here. In the first place, both in Carter v. Boehm and in every
9 Here I have drawn substantially from two of my earlier articles; see "The Doctrine of
'Uberrima Fides' in Insurance Law - A Critical Evaluation," 32 M.L.R. 615 (1969);
and "The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract: A Comparison of the American and
English Law of Insurance", 47 M.L.R. 505 (1984), at pp. 508-10.
10 (1766), 3 Burr. 1905,97 E.R. 1162 (K.B.).
11 Ibid., at p. 1909.
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insurance case Lord Mansfield decided, he found for the insured.
Thus, in Noble v. Kennoway, 12 he held that the underwriter was
under a duty to inform himself with respect to the practice of the
trade that he insured. Then, in Court v. Martineau,13 Lord
Mansfield held that the insurer had waived the need to have
information from the insured by accepting a very large premium
for the risk.
Secondly, in Carter v. Boehm, 14 Lord Mansfield stated that the
doctrine of good faith was "applicable to all contracts and
dealings". 1 5 The fact that Lord Mansfield thought that his
principle applied to all contracts suggests very strongly that he
favoured a very narrow duty of disclosure. A broad duty of
disclosure is simply inconsistent with a capitalist law of contract.
In the 20th century, 16 the English courts have disregarded both
what Mansfield said and did and they have imposed a very broad
duty of disclosure on the insured. The results of this course of
action have generally been seen in recent years to be disastrous to
the insured.
Uberrima Fides in Operation
It is possible within the confines of this article to select only
some of the unfortunate decisions that good faith has produced.
In Home v. Poland,17 the insured was an alien who had been
born in Rumania and had come to England at the age of 12.
Twenty-two years later he took out an insurance policy against
burglary. When he claimed in respect of an alleged loss, the
insurer pleaded that the insured had failed to disclose the place of
his alien birth and this failure to disclose a material fact voided
the policy. Lush J. upheld the defence and found for the insurer.
Probably, the decision in Home v. Poland represented sound
"community morality" to the insurers; 8 it also may well have
12 (1780), 2 Doug. 510,99 E.R. 326 (K.B.).
13 (1782), 3 Doug. 161,99 E.R. 591 (K.B.).
14 See, supra, footnote 10.
15 Ibid., at p. 1910.
16 1 date the modem English law from the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Joel
v. Law Union and Crown Insurance, [1908] 2 K.B. 863 (C.A.), affg [1908] 2 K.B. 431.
There are two 19th century decisions which recognize a broad duty of disclosure on the
part of the insured but these decisions are aberrant; see Bates v. Hewitt (1867), 2 Q.B.
595; and London Ass'ce v. Mansel (1879), 11 Ch. D. 363 (C.A.).
17 [1922] 2 K.B. 364. The decision in Home v. Poland has now been reversed by the Race
Relations Act 1976 (U.K.), c. 74; see ss. 3 and 20.
18 English insurers were still practising discrimination against members of at least one
1987-881
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represented sound "community morality" to most of the English
judiciary in 1922. Equally certainly, it would not have been seen
as an example of "decent behaviour" or good "community moral-
ity" among the insuring public. For one thing, the insuring public
would be quite unaware that the law required them to disclose
material facts on their own initiative. After all, they were (and
are) not required to disclose such information about themselves
when applying for employment, 19 for a lease or for credit.
Next, the Court of Appeal held, in Locker and Woolf, Ltd. v.
Western Australian Insurance Co. Ltd.,20 that an insured must
report a rejection for motor vehicle insurance when he applied
for fire insurance. This decision is remarkable because even an
insured who knows about the duty of disclosure would be aston-
ished to discover that it had such a broad scope. As the Law
Reform Committee Report on Conditions and Exceptions in
Insurance Policies21 pointed out in 1957, "a fact may be material
to insurers ... which would not necessarily appear to a proposer
for insurance, however, honest and careful, to be one which he
ought to disclose.""
Then there have been cases where the insurer has been able to
avoid liability because of the insured's criminal convictions which
had not been disclosed. Thus, in Schoolman v. Hall,23 the insured
suffered a burglary loss which the insurer admitted to be genuine.
Despite the fact that the insured's record related to a "dim and
remote past ' 24 - the most recent of the insured's convictions had
taken place 15 years before the taking out of the policy - the
court upheld the insurer's defence.
In Regina Fur v. Bossom, 25 Pearson J. accepted as material a
racial group as late as 1966; see W.W. Daniel, Racial Discrimination in England
(Penguin Special, 1966), pp. 200-3. Daniel demonstrated that a West Indian applicant
who was carefully matched as regards relevant criteria such as motoring history and
occupation with a white Englishman and an immigrant of Hungarian origin, suffered
discrimination at the hands of 17 to 20 insurers, as compared with his two co-applicants.
On six occasions cover was refused altogether, and on 11 other occasions the West
Indian applicant was quoted a higher premium that was demanded of the other two
applicants. How far the situation has changed in the last 20 years is anyone's guess.
19 But see now the remarkable decision in Courtright v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1983), 5
D.L.R. (4th) 488, 45 O.R. (2d) 52, 26 B.L.R. 17 (H.C.J.), affd 18 D.L.R. (4th) 639n,
50 O.R. (2d) 560n (C.A.).
20 [1936] 1 K.B. 408 (C.A.).
21 Cmnd. 62, 1957.
22 Ibid., at p. 4, para. 4.
23 [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 139 (C.A.).
24 Ibid., at p. 143.
25 [195712 Lloyd's Rep. 466, affd [195812 Lloyd's Rep. 425.
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single conviction for receiving stolen property in 1933, more than
20 years before taking out the policy. Similarly, in Woolcott v.
Sun Alliance and London Insurance,26 the plaintiff applied for fire
insurance on his house through the building society to which he
was making at the same time a mortgage application. He failed to
disclose the fact that he had been convicted of robbery some 12
years earlier.
Some of these results might be decided differently since the
passing of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974,-27 which
seeks to erase criminal convictions after a certain period of time.
The Act lays down a complicated tariff. Thus, a conviction
resulting in a sentence of two and one-half years' imprisonment
or more can never be erased. Otherwise, convictions with
custodial sentences of between six months and two and one-half
years become spent after 10 years and those of less than six
months after seven years. In respect of other sentences, the
period is five years, except in relation to absolute discharges (six
months) and probation (one year). 28
To complicate matters further, s. 7(3) of the Act gives the court
a discretion to admit evidence as to spent convictions if the court
is satisfied that "justice cannot be done in the case except by
admitting it."
I have dealt with this statute in some detail because it demon-
strates the difficulties and the need to counter the disastrous
results that a principle of "good faith" was producing. 29
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 deals only with the
conviction of the insured; it does not deal, for example, with the
criminal record of a spouse or family member. Thus, in Lambert
v. Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. ,30 a wife had insured her
property, which was stolen.31 Her claim was rejected, with regret,
26 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 493 (Q.B.).
27 (U.K.), c. 53.
28 Ibid., s. 4(3)(a).
29 In one case, in which the facts arose before the passage of the Rehabilitation of
Offenders Act, the judge was able to hold that evidence of a previous conviction was an
immaterial fact; see Reynolds v. Phoenix Ass'ce Co. Ltd., [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 22
(C.A.).
30 [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 485; the decision is trenchantly criticized by Merkin, 39 M.L.R.
478(1976).
31 A small portion of the property insured belonged to the husband but nothing seems to
have turned on this fact.
4-13 C.B.LJ.
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by the court because she had failed to disclose that her husband
had a criminal record !32
Before I deal with proposed reforms in the United Kingdom, it
is worth noting that while the cases state that the insurer owes
duties of disclosure to the insured, 33 there is only one case which
has applied this principle. That was the decision of Pain J. in
Horry v. Tate & Lyle Refineries Ltd.34 In this case, the insurer
settled a personal injury claim for £1,000. Pain J. held that: (i) the
insurer was obliged to point out that the sum offered was on the
low side; (ii) that they should have supplied the victim with a copy
of the medical report supplied by his (the plaintiff's doctor); (iii)
they should have made sure the plaintiff understood that if he
accepted the money, that would be an end of the matter; and (iv)
the plaintiff should have had an opportunity of testing himself
back at work and a proper opportunity of thinking over the offer.
The effect of the decision is highly problematic. For one thing,
the decision may be weakened or nullified by an appellate court.
Second, it is extremely uncertain how many accident victims and
lawyers will know of the decision. 35
For the rest, the insurer does not have to disclose anything.
Thus, insurers do not have to notify a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy taken out by the insured, without the benefici-
ary's knowledge, after the insured's death. 36 Insurers are also
under no duty to disclose the rate of return on the investments
made to their policyholders. 37 Finally, an insurer will not have to
disclose that it has sefious financial problems 38 or that it has
unskilled staff or incompetent actuaries.
32 It remains an open question whether the courts will apply the principle in Lambert to
other members of the household.
33 See, e.g., the dicta in Carter v. Boehm (1766), 3 Burr. 1905 at p. 1910, 97 E.R. 1162
(K.B.); Re Bradley and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society, [1912] 1 K.B. 415
(C.A.), at p. 430.
34 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 416. It is remarkable that such an important decision should be
buried in the comparative obscurity of Lloyd's Reports.
35 Other limitations on the scope of the decision are pointed out by Merkin in his note,
"Personal Injury Compensation: Slightly Sugaring the Pill", 46 M.L.R. 99 (1983).
36 See the excellent note, "Insurer's Duty to Disclose the Existence of a Policy", 76
Colum. L. Rev. 825 (1976). This note discusses American authorities, but English and
Canadian law follow the same rule.
37 The question of price disclosure does not seem to be discussed at all in the United
Kingdom.
38 Between 1946 and 1971 more than 20 automobile insurers collapsed. At no time did
anyone raise the question of the insurer's duty to disclose their parlous financial state. If
this seems an unrealistic duty to impose, it must be remembered that this is no more an
unrealistic duty than those currently imposed on the insured.
[Vol. 13
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Eventually, the Law Commission was forced into examining
the duty of disclosure. In its report issued in 1980 the
commission39 recommended the retention of a duty of disclosure.
This was so because such a duty was recognized "by the laws of all
the common law ... jurisdictions which we have been able to
study". 40 Apart from the fact that this is not a reason which
should carry any force, it is simply not true. In Canada, the duty
of disclosure has been severely restricted in the fields of fire, life
and disability insurance.41 The duty of disclosure has been
restricted even more severely in the United States which, as to 49
states and federal jurisdiction, is surely a common law country.42
At the same time the commission thought the law was
"defective" 43 but it opposed both the abolition of the duty of
disclosure or a "special attenuated duty" 44 for the insured.
Instead, the insured is to be under an obligation to disclose facts
which a reasonable person rather than a reasonable insurer would
think material. 45 This is the same solution as was recommended
by the Law Reform Committee in 1957. 46
Apart from the fact that no attempt is made to give any content
to the insurer's duty of disclosure, there are a number of serious
difficulties with the commission's proposals. In the first place, it
seems to be assumed that the average consumer applicant knows
that there is a duty of disclosure at all. It is likely, in my view, that
most people, without a legal training, have no knowledge of any
duty of disclosure. Professor Atiyah, in a comment addressed to
the Law Commission after their working paper had appeared,47
suggested that the commission try to find out how many people
without a legal training knew about the duty of disclosure. Sadly,
the commission did not do this.
If applicants for insurance have no knowledge of the duty of
39 Cmnd. 8064, 1980.
40 Ibid., at p. 42.
41 See infra, text at footnotes 51 to 79.
42 See infra, text at footnotes 96 to 106.
43 See Report, supra, footnote 39, at p. 107.
44 Ibid., at pp. 46-7.
45 Ibid., at p. 49, para. 51.
4 "Cmnd. 62, 1957, para. 14.47 Atiyah, Comments on Law Commission Working Paper No. 73 of Insurance Law, p. 6,
para. 7.
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disclosure but they are required to disclose what a reasonable
applicant would have disclosed, then we have a truly Gilbertian
situation. Theoretically, a judge could say that since the applicant
has no knowledge of the duty of disclosure she is not obliged to
disclose anything, but this is unlikely to occur. Judges will
assume, as the Law Commission did, that applicants for insurance
know about the duty of disclosure. Many (perhaps most) judges
will assume that applicants are as familiar with the duty of
disclosure as they (the judges) are.
To this must be added the crucial factor of the proof of materi-
ality. In a Scottish case, Zurich General Accident and Liability
Insurance Co. v. Leven, 48 Lord Robertson observed: "I recognise
that in a case of this kind it may be difficult for litigants in the
position of defenders to procure suitable opinion evidence." 49
This difficulty in obtaining expert evidence on what is "material"
will be with insureds even after the proposed change in the law. It
is true that the experts will not be giving expert evidence as to
what would influence a prudent insurer as material, but rather
evidence of what a prudent insured would think material.
However, the line here is going to be very fine and, in some cases,
invisible.
In short, no one has been able plausibly to defend the British
doctrine of uberimma fides, at least since the end of World War
II. On the other hand, the number of critics who are in favour of
its abolition is growing. 50 If the doctrine survives, it will not be
because it has anything to do with "fairness", "decent human
behaviour" or "community morality". It will survive because of
the enormous political power that insurance companies enjoy.
Good Faith in Canadian Insurance Law
The insured's duty of disclosure is narrower in Canada than it is
in England. This is because the duty has been virtually abolished
in fire insurance, 51 and it has been severely curtailed in life and
disability insurance.
48 [1940] S.C. 407.
49Ibid., at p. 411.
50 See Hasson, supra, footnote 9; Merkin, supra, footnote 30; Atiyah, supra, footnote 47;
Collins, The Law of Contract (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), p. 94; Birds,
"The Reform of Insurance Law", J. Bus. L. 449 (1982), at pp. 450-4.
51 See statutory condition 1, s. 125 of the Ontario Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218. The
other provinces have identical provisions.
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Fire Insurance
In fire insurance the insured's duty of disclosure is violated only
if there has been a fraudulent withholding of information.5 2 The
Supreme Court of Canada held, in Taylor v. London Ass'ce
Corp. 53 that fraud here meant common law fraud and not "equi-
table" fraud. Now, it is difficult enough to prove fraud when the
contracting party makes a representation; 54 it is virtually impos-
sible to prove fraud when the contracting party says nothing at
all. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that I have not been
able to find a case since 1935 where an insurer has been able to
prove fraudulent non-disclosure. 55
The special rule relating to fire insurance can produce bizarre
results. Suppose a homeowner takes out a multi-peril policy with
company A in 1982. This policy covers him against loss by fire and
theft. In 1983, he suffers loss through fire and theft in respect of
which he is reimbursed. In 1984, he changes his coverage to
company B because of B's lower rates. He does not disclose his
previous losses. In 1985, he suffers losses again through fire and
theft. In this case, the insurer will almost certainly have to pay in
respect of the fire loss, since it is most unlikely that the insurer
will be able to prove that he was guilty of "fraudulent non-disclo-
sure". However, the insurer will have little difficulty in resisting
the claim for theft since here it only has to prove that the insured
failed to disclose a material fact to the insurer. The insured's only
hope is that the court will treat the multi-peril policy as essentially
a fire insurance policy56 and apply the rule in Taylor v. London
Ass'ce Corp.57 But even if the court did this, we still have the
52 The position was unclear until the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Taylor case (see infra, footnote 53).
53 [1935] S.C.R. 422, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 129.
54 See, e.g., G.K.N. Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro, [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555 (C.A.),
where there was the clearest evidence of fraud but no allegation of fraud was made by
the plaintiff!
55 Goldshlager v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd. (1977), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 355, 19 O.R. (2d) 166
is sometimes cited as an example of fraudulent non-disclosure but I regard it as a case of
simple misrepresentation. The insured's agent was asked how many mortgages there
were on her house; he said "three" when in fact there were seven. The judge dealt with
the case on the basis of non-disclosure but there was no need to do this.
56 This question was first brought to the attention of the Association of Superintendents in
1939. The issue remains unresolved right up to the present day; see Baer, "Recent
Developments in Canadian Law: Insurance Law", 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 631 (1985), at pp.
636-9.
57 See, supra, footnote 53.
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anomalous rule of one rule of disclosure for fire insurance and
another for theft, liability, crop and other insurances. 58
The reason why there is a special rule for fire insurance has
nothing, of course, to do with "community standards of morality"
and the like. The explanation for the special rule in fire insurance
has to do with the fact that fire insurance was the first insurance
contract to be regulated in Canada 9 and, since the insurance
industry in Canada at that time was relatively weak, it was
possible to insert a number of provisions which give more
protection to the insured than exists in other insurance contracts.
The rule requiring the insured's disclosure to be "fraudulent" is
one such rule. Another special fire insurance rule is the power
that was given to the courts to strike out an "exclusion, stipula-
tion, condition or warranty ... if it is held to be unjust or unrea-
sonable by the court".6o
Life Insurance
The insured's duty of disclosure is limited in life insurance by
the existence of the "incontestable" clause. The role of the
"incontestable" clause is to prevent insurers from raising the
defences of misrepresentation and non-disclosure after the policy
has been in force for two years, unless the insurer can prove
fraud. 61 The incontestability clause was devised in the United
States as a device to help sell life insurance. 62 In some states, the
policy is incontestable after one year.63 Furthermore, in the
United States, the policy is incontestable after the one or two-
year period (depending on the relevant state law) even if the
insurer can prove fraud. 64
In Canada, given the difficulty of proving "fraudulent non-dis-
58 This anomaly has troubled at least one other commentator; see Comment by Heigh-
ington, 34 Can. Bar Rev. 93 (1956).
59 The constitutionality of this regulation was upheld in Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada
v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.).
60 See s. 128 of the Ontario Insurance Act. An identical provision appears in other
provincial legislation. This provision was applied for the first time in Krupich v. Safeco
Insurance Co. of America (1985), 63 A.R. 30, 16 C.C.L.I. 18 (Q.B.).
61 See, e.g., Holland, "The Incontestable Clause" in Krueger and Waggoner, eds., The
Life Insurance Policy Contract (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1953), p. 57; W.F. Young
Jr.," 'Incontestable' - as to What?", [1964] U. Ill. L. F. 323.
62 See Holland, ibid.
63 See Belth, Life Insurance: A Consumer's Handbook (Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1973), p. 124.64 Ibid.
[Vol. 13
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closure", there appears to be only one reported case in which the
insurer was able to prove this. In Berthiaume v. Great West Life
Ass'ce Co. ,65 the Quebec Court of Appeal decided by a 3-2
majority that the insured had been guilty of fraudulent non-dis-
closure.
If the policy has not been in force for two years, then the
ordinary law of disclosure can be used in a manner that is
reminiscent of the English case law. This is illustrated by the
grotesque decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Henwood
v. Prudential Insurance Co. 66 In this case, Ms Henwood took out
a life insurance policy when she was 19 years old. In it she named
her mother as the beneficiary. Fourteen months later she was
killed in a car accident.
After leaving school at the age of 16, Ms Henwood, a practising
and devout Roman Catholic, fell in love with a young man whose
faith was that of a Jehovah's Witness. Considerable pressure was
brought on Ms Henwood to break off the relationship, which she
did. However, after doing so, the insured developed a certain
amount of stomach distress and insomnia. Her family doctor
described Ms Henwood as a
" ... normal average, teen-age girl at that age when they usually start to
have some problems, discussions at home, arguments with parents, or
especially father due to some disagreement about dates and things like that,
but nothing unusual." 67
Her mother then insisted on Ms Henwood seeing a psychiatrist.
Ms Henwood, in fact, saw two psychiatrists68 but neither seemed
to think that she was ill or needed extended treatment.
In September, 1962, Ms Henwood's mother went into hospital
for a serious operation. From that date until February, 1963,
when her mother was unable to do the household chores, the
insured did all the housework. This included getting up at 6:30
a.m. and making breakfast for her stepfather, her brothers and
two boarders. She did all the cooking, laundry and paid all the
household bills. In February, 1963, she accepted a job as a
65 (1945), 12 I.L.R. 84.
66 (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 715, [1967] S.C.R. 720.
67 See the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice Spence, ibid., at p. 724 D.L.R., p. 730
S.C.R.
68 She saw a Dr. Blake on three occasions but stopped seeing him because she could not
afford his fees. She also saw a Dr. Murray in the outpatient's clinic at St. Michael's
hospital from April, 1962, to June 28, 1962; see the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice
Spence, ibid., at pp. 724-5 D.L.R., pp. 730-1 S.C.R.
1987-88]
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bookkeeper, where she worked until her death in a car accident
15 months later.
Prudential Insurance called its doctor, Dr. Roadhouse, who
was not a psychiatrist but who none the less gave evidence to the
effect that Ms Henwood was suffering from "severe neurosis" 69
and would not have been considered an acceptable risk.
Mr. Justice Ritchie, writing for the majority (Spence J. dissent-
ing), upheld Prudential's claim. The majority concluded that,
although Dr. Roadhouse was testifying only about what the
Prudential would have done, there is no evidence to suggest that
"this was unreasonable or that other insurance companies would
have followed a different course." This approach makes a
mockery of the "prudent insurer" test which had been unques-
tioned law since 1924,71 and which is supposed to give the insured
a little protection.
The second disturbing feature of the case is how the majority
came to regard Dr. Roadhouse as an expert in psychiatry when he
repeatedly professed ignorance in that field. 72
Finally, it is disturbing that the court should have overlooked
the evidence of the doctors who examined Ms Henwood and who
found her normal.
As a precedent, Henwood could hardly be less satisfactory.
One must take comfort from the fact that in the most recent case
on disclosure in life insurance, the courts have taken a more




There are incontestability provisions in the case of disability
insurance (accident and sickness insurance) similar to the one
69 See the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice Spence, ibid., at p. 726 D.L.R., p. 736
S.C.R.
71 See Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N.Y. v. Ontario Metal Products Co., [192511 D.L.R.
583, [1925] A.C. 344 (P.C.).
72 See the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice Spence, supra, footnote 66, at p. 730
D.L.R., p. 7 3 6 S.C.R.
73 See Hudson v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 115, [1975]
I.L.R. 1-660 (B.C.S.C.), affd 74 D.L.R. (3d) 321, [1977] I.L.R. 1-855 (B.C.A.). In this
case, the courts held that the insured need not disclose evidence of severe depression
since this did not constitute mental illness. The force of the decision is undermined
considerably by the fact that the insurer already had information relating to Mr.
Hudson's depression.
(Vol, 13
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existing in life insurance7 4 but there appears to be no litigation in
this area. One reason for this may be that disability insurance is
sold to a very narrow section of the population.75
Policy Renewals
Uberrima fides becomes important on the renewal of a policy.
This is illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Turgeon v. Fortin.76 In that case, the insured had obtained an
auto liability policy on August 7, 1959. The insured was asked
before issuance of the policy if he had ever had his licence
suspended or revoked. To this question, he answered truthfully
that he had not. The insured renewed his policy on August 7,
1960 and again on August 7, 1961.
However, on July 31, 1961, the insured pleaded guilty to a
charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol contrary to
s. 223 of the Criminal Code, and his licence was suspended for
three months. In October, 1961, the insured was involved in an
accident as a result of his negligence. The insurer disclaimed
liability because the insured had failed to disclose his disqualifi-
cation from driving in July, 1961. The Supreme Court held, by a
majority of 3-2, 77 that the insured had been guilty of non-dis-
closure and the insurer was not liable.
To be sure, the case would have been decided on the basis of
misrepresentation 78 but there are serious objections to applying
principles of non-disclosure or misrepresentation to a renewal
situation. To allow the insurer to prove, say, five years later that
an insured's answer was incorrect is not fair. For one thing, the
insured may have forgotten what answer he gave in the proposal
form. Second, even if he can remember the answer, he may
believe that the change in circumstances is immaterial. It would
be no great burden for insurers to get insureds to check the
answers given in the original proposal form.
In fire insurance, when the insured renews this doctrine can
74 See s. 262 of the Ontario Insurance Act.
75 See Report of the Select Committee on Company Law, The Insurance Industry Fifth
Report on Accident and Sickness Insurance (1981), p. 151.
76 (1968), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 308, [1969] S.C.R. 286, sub nom. Turgeon v. Atlas Ass'ce Co.
Ltd..
77 Mr. Justice Fauteux gave the judgment of the majority for himself and Justices
Martland and Judson; Mr. Justice Pigeon gave a dissenting opinion for himself and Mr.
Justice Hall.
78 See, e.g., Re Wilson & Scottish Ins. Corp. Ltd., [1920] 2 Ch. 28.
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undermine the protection given to the insured by requiring the
insurer to prove that the insured withheld information
"fraudulently". 79 Consider the following example. A took out fire
insurance for his business in 1980. In reply to the question,
"Estimate your turnover during the past year", the insured
answered truthfully: $100,000. A renewed his policy in 1981,
1982, 1983 and 1984. In 1985, his business premises were
destroyed by fire. By 1985, his turnover had dropped to $50,000.
The insurer would not seek to rely on "fraudulent non-disclo-
sure", since that is virtually impossible to prove. Instead, it would
rely on misrepresentation of a material fact. The insurer would
argue, with great chance of success, that the insured's drop in
turnover constituted a "moral hazard". Thus, a protection given
by the Insurance Act in respect of "fraudulent non-disclosures"
would be nullified.
The Insurer's Duty of Disclosure
One might expect the insurer to owe at least some kind of duty
of disclosure to the insured. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
In Pense v. The Northern Life Ass'ce Co. ,80 the insured had the
right to a paid up policy or extended insurance if his policy lapsed
because of non-payment of premium. The insured had to signify
which of the two benefits he wished to claim. The insured did not
claim these options before the policy lapsed, probably because he
did not know what they meant.81 In any event, it was not argued
that the insurer owed a duty to disclose to the insured that it could
claim either of these benefits. To this day, there is no duty on an
insurer after the insured has surrendered the policy to explain the
insured's options under the policy.
There is some doubt as to whether Canadian courts are even
willing to accept an insurer's duty to co-operate. In Kropelyn v.
Federated Life Insurance Co.,82 the insured had made an
overpayment of a premium by mistake under a life policy. The
insured did not make a payment within the grace period and the
policy lapsed. The beneficiary argued that the insurer was obliged
79 See text at, supra, footnote 51.
80 (1907), 15 O.L.R. 131 (C.A.), affd 42 S.C.R. 246.
811 have found in my experience as an insurance law teacher that students do not know
what these terms mean. I would expect laymen to have no better idea of what these
terms mean.
82 (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 311, [1984] I.L.R. 1-1803 (B.C.S.C.).
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to apply the overpayment so as to prevent the lapse of the policy.
American authorities were cited including one from a leading
insurance text which stated: 83
The general rule is that where an insurer has in its hands funds absolutely
belonging to the insured, sufficient to prevent a forfeiture, it must apply
those funds to the payment of premiums in order to prevent a default from
terminating the policy protection.
Finch J. rejected this contention because in the American
authorities the insurer had either actual or constructive
knowledge that it was indebted to the insured. This distinction is
manifestly unsatisfactory. At some point, the insurer had
knowledge that it was in possession of funds belonging to the
insured.
The lesson of the Kropelyn case is that before we go chasing
after concepts such as "good faith", we need to learn to apply
well-established concepts such as "the duty to co-operate".
84
Good Faith and the Insurer's Duty to Defend a Liability Claim
There is a small group of cases in which Canadian courts have
started using "good faith" in liability claims.
Thus, in the Ontario case of Pelky v. Hudson Bay Insurance
Co.; McKitrick, Erickson, Jones (Third Party),85 the insured,
Fortes, was covered under an automobile policy issued by Royal
Insurance with a $50,000 limit. The common law spouse of the
insured, Pelky, was involved in an accident, and one passenger
was rendered a quadriplegic and another passenger was hospi-
talized for five months. The passengers sued Pelky and Fortes.
Prior to trial, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted an offer to settle
within the policy limits. Royal's solicitor did not communicate the
offer to Royal and proceeded to trial where judgment was
awarded in the plaintiff's favour in the amount of $137,060.43 and
$12,000 respectively.
Pelky and Fortes, being unable to satisfy the judgment, began
an action against Royal and its solicitor for $50,000. Mr. Justice
Catzman held Royal liable but did so on the basis of modern
American authorities.
83 See Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (1944), vol. 15, p. 49, at s. 8271, quoted at
(1984), 6 C.C.L.I. 19 at p. 24.
84 See Burrows, "Contractual Co-Operation and the Implied Term", 31 M.L.R. 390
(1968).
85 (1981), 35 O.R. (2d) 97, [1982] I.L.R. 1-1493 (H.C.J.).
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The learned judge wrote: 86
"... in every contract, including policies of insurance, there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything
that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement ... that the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case although the express
terms of the policy do not impose the duty; that in determining whether to
settle the insurer must give the interests of the insured at least as much
consideration as it gives its own interests; and that when 'there is a great
risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be made within
those limits, a consideration in good faith of the insured's interest requires
the insurer to settle the claim.'
... the test is whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have
accepted the settlement offer."
There is at least one other case in which an Ontario judge used
"good faith" to resolve the insurer's duty to defend liability
claims. 87 However, as Warren Grover points out, there is no need
to use concepts of "good" and "bad" faith here. It is enough to
say that the insurer was in breach of its contract to use reasonable
care.
88
Seventy-five years ago Mr. Justice Holmes, when dealing with
an identical problem, also saw no need to resort to concepts such
as "good faith". In St. Louis Dressed Beef and Provision Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co. ,89 the defendant insurer issued a policy
insuring the plaintiff for one year against liability for injuries
caused by vehicles or the horses of the insured. The policy
provided that if a suit were brought against the plaintiff to enforce
a claim, the insurer would defend or settle the proceeding (up to
$5,000 for any one injured person).
In 1901, the plaintiffs employee negligently injured Mrs.
Nellie Heideman. Mrs. Heideman sued for $10,000 and her
husband sued for $3,000. The insured notified the insurer of the
accident but the latter took no action. Eventually, the plaintiff
settled both claims for $2,500. It now sought to recover this sum,
together with attorney's fees, from its insurer.
The insurer argued that the insured should have defended the
86 Ibid., at p. 115 O.R., pp. 5707-8 I.L.R.
87 Dillon v. Guardian Insurance Co., [1983] 2 C.C.L.I. 227, [1983] I.L.R. 1-1706 (Ont.
H.C.J.).
88 See Grover, supra, footnote 1, at p. 106.
89 201 U.S. 173 (1906).
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suit against it. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court, rejected this contention. Holmes J. wrote:90
Contracts rarely provide in detail for their non-performance. It would be
stretching the words quoted to a significance equally hurtful to both parties,
and probably equally absent from the minds of both, to read them as having
within their scope an initial repudiation of liability by the defendant, and a
requirement that, in that event, the plaintiff should be bound to try the case
against itself, although it should be plain that by a compromise it could
reduce its claim on the defendant as well as its own loss.
For Holmes J., the insurer's failure to defend was a simple
breach-of-contract case. There was no need to talk about "good
faith" and other phantoms.
The approach taken in St. Louis Dressed Beef 1 has also been
taken in some Canadian cases. Thus, in Shore Boat Builders v.
Canadian Indemnity Co. ,92 the insured, a boat builder, insured
against liability in respect of defective boats built by him. The
insurer assumed any "liability imposed by law". The insured built
a boat for the customer but the boat was built defectively and the
customer suffered damages to the extent of $7,279.91.
The insured paid the customer this sum but the insurer refused
to indemnify the insured because the phrase "liability imposed by
law" meant that there had to be a formal judgment against the
insured. Hutcheon J. rejected this contention; in his view the
insured was entitled to be reimbursed if he made a reasonable
settlement. The requirement of a formal judgment would only
add to the expense of the insured's recovery. Again, no mention
was made of any duty of "good faith".
Then, in McDonough v. Fire Insurance Co. of Canada,93 the
insured had taken out an automobile policy with her insurer.
When the insured was involved in an accident, her insurer refused
to defend her. In the event, the insured was held not liable and
the action against her was dismissed. However, she received no
costs and her solicitor's costs were taxed at $2,000. When she
sought to recover this sum from her insurer, the insurer argued
that it had a right to withdraw from the insured's defence because
the insured had breached a policy provision. Wren Co. Ct. J. held
that the insurer's correct course of action in this situation was to
seek to be joined as a third party from which position it could
90 Ibid., at p. 183.
91 See, supra, footnote 89.
92 (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 628, [1975] I.L.R. 1-674 (B.C.S.C.).
93 (1974), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 671,8 0.R. (2d) 29 (Co. Ct.).
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seek to deny liability. Again, quite sensibly, the judge does not
seek to traverse the swamps of "good faith".
Although the doctrine of good faith is more limited in Canada
than it is in England, it causes hardships for the insured. Among
academic commentators, only Professor Rendall seems to think
that there is a marginal role for the doctrine. 94
Further, the duty of disclosure is one-sided. The insurer does
not seem to be under any duty to disclose anything.
Finally, the courts are beginning to use the concept of "good
faith" to impose a duty on the insurer to defend the insured. I
have argued that this duty is totally unnecessary; its only function
seems to be to make opinions longer than they are at present.
In short, it would be a desirable development if "good faith"
could be removed from Canadian insurance law. Once it was
removed, it would be possible to deal with some of the real
problems in that body of law.
Good Faith in U.S. Insurance Law
The insured's duty of disclosure has been reduced to what
Harnett rightly calls a "remnant" in the law. 95 The major decision
in this area is that of Judge Taft - later President and, later still,
Chief Justice of the United States - in Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Mechanics Savings Bank and Trust Co.96 In this
very influential judgment, Judge Taft held that an applicant for
insurance need not disclose "self-disgracing facts". 97
Later, courts began to insist that the insurer show that the
insured's non-disclosure was fraudulent. Thus, in Roberto v.
Hartford Fire Insurance,98 the insured was an alien who had been
imprisoned for perjury and was liable to deportation for this
offence. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
in the absence of inquiry, the insurer had to show that the insured
had fraudulently concealed this information. Requiring the
insurer to show that information has been fraudulently concealed
is virtually impossible, particularly in the presence of a jury.
94 See his comment, "The Disclosure Duty in Fire Insurance: Herein of Insincere Appli-
cants, of Apathetic Agents and of Unwise Judicial Expatiation", 12 Man. L.J. 393
(1982), at p. 396.
95 See his article, "The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the Law of Insurance",
15 L. and Contemp. Problems 391 (1950).
96 72 Fed. 413 (C.C.A. 6th, 1896).
97 Ibid., at p. 435.
98 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir., 1949).
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In the case of life insurance, once the policy has been in force
for one year (in some states, two years), the insurer will not be
able to avoid the policy even if it can prove a fraudulent
disclosure.99
In one area the U.S. courts have not required that the insurer
prove that the insured withheld information fraudulently. This is
in the rare situation where there is a change in the insured's
health or a change in other circumstances between the time the
insured fills in the proposal form and the acceptance of the risk by
the company.
Two cases will illustrate how this duty operates. In Stipcich v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,100 the insured applied for life
insurance and filled in a proposal form. At the time Stipcich filled
in the proposal form, he was in good health. Shortly after filling it
in, however, he was told by a physician that he needed an
operation to remove an ulcer. Mr. Justice Stone, giving the
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, held that a different rule
applied in the "change of circumstances" situation. According to
the court "the most elementary spirit of fair dealing would seem
to require him to make a full disclosure." 10 1
Fortunately, Mr. Stipcich had informed his agent of the
medical condition so that Stipcich's beneficiary was allowed to
recover.
Stipcich was followed in Mackenzie v. Prudential Insurance
Co. 102 Mackenzie applied for life insurance and his medical
examination revealed that he was in good health and his blood
pressure was found to be 140/78 (within normal limits). A short
while later, Mackenzie suffered a chest bruise. When he visited
his doctor, it was found that his blood pressure had risen to
170/100 (higher than normal). Mackenzie was given a diuretic to
decrease his blood pressure and he was advised to get a medical
check-up. Mackenzie did not disclose this information to the
insurer. On Mackenzie's death, the insurer successfully resisted a
claim by Mackenzie's beneficiary, because Mackenzie had not
disclosed his subsequent accident to the insurer.
These cases are most unfortunate. It is perfectly reasonable for
99 See Belth, supra, note 63.
100 277 U.S. 311 (1928).
101 Ibid., at p. 317.
102 411 F. 2d 781 (6th Cir. 1969).
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applicants for insurance to assume that they will be accepted or
rejected based on the information they have provided in the
proposal form.
The rule in cases such as Stipcich and McKenzie is to some
extent neutralized by the insurer's duty to process a life insurance
application promptly. 10 3 In one case, an insurer was held not to
have processed an application promptly because it did not do so
within 48 hours!1°4
The Insurer's Duty of Disclosure
The insurer's duty of disclosure in the United States is
extremely attenuated. Thus, the insurance industry is alone
among financial institutions in the United States in not having to
disclose the rate of return on an insured's investment. 10 5 The need
for such disclosure is particularly urgent since the returns on the
insured's investment are very poor. 106
In one remarkable case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Bowler v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of New York, 1°7 however,
imposed a duty of disclosure on the insured. Bowler had a
disability policy which entitled him to payment for 200 weeks. If
the insured was still permanently disabled at the end of 200
weeks, the company was obliged to pay him benefits for another
600 weeks. At the end of 200 weeks, the insurer's doctor decided
that Bowler was not totally disabled. This finding was written
despite the fact that the insurer's doctor found that Bowler still
had an ulcer on his right foreleg and walked with a cane and a
limp. Further, the report noted that Bowler had "a very, very
poor leg and foot". 10 8 Despite this bleak diagnosis, the report
103 The first case to impose liability on an insurer in this kind of situation was Duffy v.
Banker's Life Ass'ce., 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913). Some cases imposed liability
on the basis of "acceptance by silence"; see, e.g., American Life Insurance Co. of
Alabama v. Hutcheson, 109 F. 2d. 424 (6th Cir., 1940).
104 See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Scott, 181 Okla. 179, 72 P. 2d 790 (1937).
105 See the Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Life Insurance Price Disclosure,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Economics (Washington, D.C., 1979). The
report stated, at p. 100, that the "insurance industry was the only savings medium that
does not disclose the rate of return paid on consumer savings".
106 Thus, for policies held for five years the return was minus 9 to minus 19%; for policies
held for 10 years the return was minus 4% to plus 2%. Finally, for policies held for 20
years the return was between 2% and 4.5%; ibid., at p. 4.
107 250 A.2d 580 (1969).
108 Ibid., at p. 586.
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concluded that Bowler "is capable of doing many types of work
and that he is not totally and completely disabled". 109
Bowler took no legal action for many years and the six-year
statute of limitations had passed. Eventually, Bowler found a
lawyer who argued, successfully, that the insurer could not shield
behind the statute of limitations because its treatment of the
policyholder was "shocking and unconscionable".110
Mr. Justice Francis, writing for a unanimous court, held that
the insurer was under a legal obligation to inform a layman that a
particular phrase had been given a broad interpretation by the
courts. The critical passage in the opinion is: 1 '
In situations where a layman might give the controlling language of the
policy a more restrictive interpretation than the insurer knows the courts
have given it and as a result the uninformed insured might be inclined to be
quiescent about the disregard or non-payment of his claim and not to press
in timely fashion, the company cannot ignore its obligation. It cannot hide
behind the insured's ignorance of the law; it cannot conceal its liability. In
these circumstances it has the duty to speak and disclose, and to act in
accordance with its contractual undertaking. The slightest evidence of
deception or overreaching will bar reliance upon time limitations for prose-
cution of the claim.
The Bowler case seems to stand in splendid isolation, although
some of the cases where there has been a "bad faith" denial of
liability in first party contracts also seek to punish unconscionable
behaviour by the insurer.112
The Insurer's Duty of Good Faith in Defending Liability Claims
It has been shown that as early as 1906 in the St. Louis Dressed
Beef 3 case the American courts recognized an insurer's duty to
defend the insured in a liability policy. The issue that arose in St.
Louis Dressed Beef has come before the American courts again
and they have reshaped the law.
In Communale v. Traders and General Insurance,114 Mr. and
Mrs. Communale were struck by a truck driven by the insured.
The insured was insured with Traders and General Insurance Co.
with a maximum liability of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per
accident. The insurers refused to defend the insured because they
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., at p. 587.
111 Ibid., at p. 588.
112 See cases cited, infra, at footnotes 126 to 132.
113 See, supra, footnote 89.
114 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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(the insurers) maintained that the insured was driving a truck that
did not belong to him. The insured hired competent counsel to
represent him. At trial, Mr. Communale recovered $25,000 and
Mrs. Communale $1,250. The insured now sought to recover this
amount from the insurer and the California Supreme Court held
that he was entitled to do so. In this case, the court used the
language of good faith and fair dealing. In the court's words: 115
There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract
that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement.
The second innovation in the Communale case is that the court
held that the insurer was liable for the excess amount, over the
policy limits. This conclusion is impossible to justify logically but
clearly the court wished to penalize insurers who breached their
duty to defend liability claims.
The penal element came to the fore in the tragic case of Crisci
v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven.116 In that case Mrs.
Crisci (the insured) had taken out a liability policy for $10,000
with the insurer, in respect of an apartment building owned by
her. One of her tenants, June Di Mare was descending the apart-
ment's wooden staircase when a tread gave way. She fell through
the resulting opening up to her waist and was left hanging 15 feet
above the ground. Mrs. Di Mare suffered serious physical injuries
and developed a very severe psychosis.
Incredibly, the insurer refused to settle for $9,000 and, at trial,
the jury awarded $101,000 to Mrs. Di Mare against the insured.
As a result of paying this judgment, the insured, a widow of 70,
became indigent. She worked as a babysitter, and her grand-
children paid her rent. Her physical health declined, she suffered
bouts of hysteria and she attempted suicide.
Eventually, the insured brought an action against her insurer.
The Supreme Court of California, by a majority of 6-1, awarded
the insured $91,000 (plus interest) on the ground that since the
insurer had acted in bad faith, it was liable for any part of the
judgment that was in excess of the $10,000 for which Mrs. Crisci
had insured. The court also awarded Mrs. Crisci $25,000 as
compensation for pain and distress.
The insurer's duty to defend a liability claim was also accepted
115 Ibid., at p. 200.
116 426 P.2d 173 (1967).
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by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Manchester Insurance and
Indemnity Co. v. Grundy,117 which held that the insurer's duty
rested in contract and tort.
The duty of the insurer to act in good faith was embraced by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rova Farms Resort Inc. v.
Investors Insurance Co. of North America.118 The insured
operated a recreational resort including a lake used by
commercial guest patrons for swimming. The insured carried
liability insurance with a maximum of $50,000. The policy
required the insurer to defend any action brought against the
insured.
Lawrence McLaughlin, a commercial invitee, dove from the
diving platform into three or four feet of murky water and his
head struck the unseen bottom of the lake. As a result of this
accident McLaughlin suffered severe physical injuries.
The insurer made an incredibly low offer of $12,500, which it
adamantly refused to increase. Eventually, at trial, the jury
awarded $225,000 to McLaughlin. Rova managed by a variety of
devices, including a mortgage on its property, to raise $175,000.
Rova sought to recover the $175,000 from its insurer. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously upheld Rova's
contention. 119 Chief Justice Hughes stressed the fact that the
insurer had never sought to increase its "first-day offer" of
$12,500. The Chief Justice stressed, at several points, that the
insurer owed the insured a "fiduciary" duty.
There is no point in reviewing further authorities. There are
two points to be made about these cases. Where an insurer has
undertaken the duty to defend an action, all one need say is that
the insurer is under a duty to act reasonably in performing its
contract. The concept of "good faith" seems redundant here.
The real function of "good faith" seems to be to allow courts to
make the insurer pay amounts in excess of the policy limits. This
is logically indefensible. If one disregards logic, the question that
arises is whether making insurers pay sums in excess of policy
limits is a desirable policy for the courts to follow.
In the short term, some victims get more generous settlements
117 531 S.W. 2d 493 (1975).
118 323 A. 2d 495 (1974).
119 Chief Justice Hughes gave the court's opinion. Mountain and Clifford JJ. gave an
opinion concurring in the result.
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and insureds are relieved from crushing liabilities, but the under-
lying problem cannot be resolved by the courts. The problem is
that Legislatures, with pressure from insurance companies, keep
the liability limits low. It is monstrous that, in a country which
awards the largest tort damages in the world, motorists are
allowed (and in some cases required) to insure for as little as, say,
$20,000 per accident. The occasional suit obtaining a sum in
excess of policy limits will not help deal with this problem.
For one thing, many accident victims will accept ludicrously
low awards out of sheer necessity. It will be remembered that in
the Crisci case, Mrs. Di Mare was prepared to accept $9,000 for a
claim that was adjudged to be worth $101,000.120
Second, some insureds will not be able to pay the excess
amount and they will have to declare bankruptcy. It is uncertain if
the trustee in bankruptcy will bring an action against the insurer
for the excess award. Third, only a minority of jurisdictions seem
to have accepted the insurer's responsibility for paying sums in
excess of the policy limit.121
What is needed are legislative changes which would make
insurers insure for unlimited amounts as they do in the United
Kingdom - at least in cases of motor vehicle injury. American
insurers have the same access to re-insurance facilities as their
English counterparts. The prospects for this kind of reform taking
place in the United States seem bleak, particularly in these days
of the "great insurance liability crisis".
Bad Faith Settlement of First Party Contracts122
Writing in 1980, Professor Eric Holmes of the University of
Georgia pointed out that the courts of at least 21 states have held
that plaintiffs could recover damages in excess of policy limits
120 See text, supra, footnote 118.
121 It is difficult to be precise about the number of jurisdictions that have accepted the rule
but I have been able to find reported cases in 17 jurisdictions.
122 The literature on this subject is voluminous; see, e.g., Holmes, "Is there Life After
Gilmore's Death of Contract? - Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith
in First Party Insurance Contracts", 65 Cor. L.Q. 330 (1980); Note, "Good Faith and
Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.", 25 Has. L.J.
699 (1974); Note, "The Expectation of Peace of Mind; A Basis for Recovery of
Damages for Mental Suffering Resulting from the Breach of First Party Insurance
Contracts", 56 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1345 (1983); Note, "Reconstructing Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort", 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1291
(1985).
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where the insurer acted in bad faith by failing to pay well-founded
claims. 123 Further, Legislatures in 17 states enacted legislation
giving courts power to award damages in excess of policy limits. 124
According to Holmes, the courts will impose this kind of
liability when the insurer's conduct has been "outrageous". 125 An
insured can run foul of procedural pitfalls in his claim for bad
faith settlement. This is well illustrated by the decision of the
Supreme Court of California in Reichert v. General Insurance Co.
of America,126 one of the early cases on the subject. In this case,
the insured had taken out a fire policy covering his motel with
four insurers. A fire caused damage to the motel to the extent of
$424,000. Reichert argued that the insurers promised to pay the
claim "fairly and with promptness and dispatch". 127 In the event,
the insurers did not do so and the insured was forced to sell his
motel and to declare bankruptcy. The insured sought $1.5 million
compensatory damages and $5 million punitive damages.
By a majority of 4-3, the California Supreme Court held that
the insured's claims for compensatory and punitive damages
vested in Reichert's trustee in bankruptcy and Reichert could not
maintain them. As the trustee in bankruptcy is less likely than the
insured to bring a claim for punitive damages, this represents a
windfall for the insurer.
This case must be contrasted with Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co. 128 In this case, the insured had taken out a policy
on his restaurant business for $35,000. The insured's premises
were destroyed by fire. The defendant insurer's adjuster, after
inspecting the damage, told the arson investigator of the Los
Angeles Fire Department that the plaintiff had excessive
coverage under his fire insurance policy. This was untrue. A few
months after this information had been passed on to the Los
Angeles Fire Department, the plaintiff was charged for having
committed arson and for having defrauded an insurer.
The insured was eventually discharged and he claimed damages
in respect of the outrageous conduct and bad faith of the insurers.
As a result, he claimed to have suffered severe economic harm
and severe emotional upset.
123 See Holmes, ibid., at p. 353.
124 Ibid., at p. 354.
12 5 Ibid., at p. 358.
126 442 P.2d 377 (1968).
127 Ibid., at p. 378.
128 510 P. 2d 1032 (1973).
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The Supreme Court of California held by a majority of 6-1 that
the insured was entitled to recover damages for mental distress
"whether or not these facts constitute 'extreme' or 'outrageous'
conduct". 129 The Supreme Court sent the case back to the trial
court for assessment of these damages.
Many of the cases of bad faith settlement involve disability or
medical insurance.
One of the earliest cases to impose liability for bad faith
settlement was Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co. 130
In that case, the insured was entitled to monthly payments of
$150 in the event of total disability. Benefits were payable for up
to 30 years.
The insured, who had only a grade four education, was
seriously injured in January, 1965, while lifting a 361-pound bale
of rubber. After an operation, the insured returned to work on
June 8, 1965, but was fired by his employer three weeks later
because he could not work. Meanwhile, the insured filed a claim
for workers' compensation for his injuries. When it looked as
though the insurer might have to pay benefits for 30 years, their
claims' supervisor argued that the insured was ill rather than
injured. Under the illness part of the policy, the insurer was liable
for only two years. In fact, the insurer made payments for only
two years and then stopped payment. The insurer also
maintained that the insured suffered from congenital back injury
- a contention for which there was no evidence. To add insult to
injury, the insurer argued that the insured had made material
misrepresentations by not giving information about his cogenital
back injury!
The insured eventually brought a claim for compensatory
damages and for punitive damages. The California Court of
Appeals for the Fourth District, by a majority of 3-1, awarded
compensatory damages and punitive damages of $164,000. The
majority stressed the fact that the "defendant's conduct was
premeditated, continuous and persistent". 131
In Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co. ,132 the complaint
related to a bad faith settlement of a medical policy. The insured
129 Ibid., at p. 1042.
13010 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1970).
131 Ibid., at p. 408.
132521 P. 2d 1103 (1974).
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had a medical policy with the insurer up to a limit of $5,000. The
insured suffered an accident as a result of which he suffered
serious injury. The insured notified the insurer of the accident
and filed a workers' compensation claim. The hospital policy
contained an exclusion for losses caused by injuries for which
compensation was payable under workers' compensation. The
policy also stated in part in capital letters: "ALL BENEFITS
PAYABLE IN FULL REGARDLESS OF ANY OTHER
INSURANCE YOU MAY HAVE."
Meanwhile the insured's application for workers' compen-
sation was denied because he was self-employed but he was
allowed to appeal this decision. 133
The insured was now being denied hospital coverage by his
insurer and workers' compensation benefits. As a result of not
receiving any benefits, the insured had to change residence five
times because of his inability to pay the rent. His utilities were
turned off several times for non-payment, his wheelchair was
repossessed and he had difficulty in affording medication to avoid
constant pain. Ultimately in 1969, the insured suffered two
nervous breakdowns.
The Supreme Court of California, by a majority of 6-1, held
that the insurer had been guilty of bad faith but it awarded only
compensatory damages amounting to $75,000. It refused to
award exemplary damages because there was no intent to injure
the insured. It is difficult to see why Mrs. Crisci, or Mr. Fletcher
for that matter,134 recovered damages for emotional distress, 35
while Mr. Silberg, whose distress seems to have been equally
great, recovered nothing under this head.
The great uncertainty in the law must undermine considerably
any deterrent value that a penalty for breach of the insurer's duty
of good faith must have. Moreover, when punitive damages are
awarded, the amounts tend to be small.1 36 This means that most,
if not all, insurers will be able to pass on the costs through higher
premiums or lower benefits.
The only satisfactory way of dealing with outrageous conduct
133 Eventually, the insured did, after a long delay, receive workers' compensation benefits.
134 See text, supra, footnote 118.
135 See text, supra, footnotes 132 and 133.
136 See Note, "Liability Insurers and Third Party Claimants: The Limits of the Duty", 48
U. Chi. L. Rev. 125 (1981). Ibid., at p. 133, note 30, the author writes: "Judgments
awarded for bad faith are trivial compared to the premium pool." Although the author
is dealing with liability claims, the same is true for first party claims.
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by insurers is to use the administrative process. Thus, agents,
adjusters and, finally, companies who are guilty of outrageous
conduct should have their licences withdrawn. This is what we do
with, for example, delinquent lawyers, doctors and car dealers.
Delinquent insurers should be treated in the same way.
Conclusion
The doctrine of "good faith" in English and Canadian
insurance law has, in my view, been a disaster. It has made an
unequal contest between insurer and insured even more unequal.
American insurers have tried to use "good faith" as a means of
assisting the insured, but the abuses that American courts seek to
curb can only be dealt with by legislative and administrative
action. Of course, it is possible to argue that the bizarre results
which have occurred in the field of insurance will not be repli-
cated in other areas of contract law. But the burden of showing
why this should not be so must rest with the proponents of the
good faith doctrine.
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